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Multiplicity of Membership in Brunei:






 The uneven aspect of globalisation, nation-state building, and international norms are 
epitomised in the continued existence of ethnic Chinese denizens of Brunei. Through 
narrative analysis of the ethnic Chinese who have migrated to Singapore, Canada, and those 
who remain in Brunei, I illustrate the multiplicity of membership in the small nation-state 
through utilizing the concept and term ‘denizenship’, which I argue is experienced by both 
stateless as well as formal citizens. I conclude my paper by making a case for working within 
the practices of citizenship, as their narratives reveal a desire and a vision for inclusion and 
belonging in a state that does not differentiate based on ethnicity.
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In 2015, a parliament member, Pehin Dato Goh King Chin proposed that provisions be given 
for stateless individuals aged 60 and above to be granted citizenship and for the Nationality Act be 
amended at the annual convening of the Legislative Council of Brunei. However, this suggestion 
was ultimately turned down, the Minister of Home Affairs stating the current nationality laws in 
place were sufficient, and that stateless persons were given official documents to travel in the place 
of a passport (Asiaone 2015).
Discussions to address the status of the ethnic Chinese in Brunei are not recent, but date back to 
the eve of Independence, where two editorials published on that day, either attempting to assuage 
concerns about citizenship (‘Ethnic Chinese residents have nothing to worry about’) or highlighting 
the issue amidst the future challenges for the nation-state (‘Brunei’s major step forward) (The 
Singapore Monitor 1983)1. As of 2013, the government reported that there were 20,524 stateless 
permanent residents (PRs) in Brunei, noting most were either of Chinese or aboriginal descent 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019). 
The existence of such a community until this day is one of the glaring examples of the hierarchies 
of membership embedded into the fabric of the nation-state. This paper analyses the narratives of 
the ethnic Chinese of Brunei, stateless as well as formal citizens, and posits that they are effectively 
a collective of denizens. The selection of experiences from this ethnographic research presents 
the intricate ways in which my informants face obstacles when they attempt to access public goods 
such as education, or land acquisition and transfer, or face detriments to the quality of life, such as 
inhibitions to travel and lack of career opportunities. Thus, the empirical examples provide a more 
intimate lens of denizenship as experienced on the ground and how it maps onto ethnicity in this 
specific case study. 
2. Methods
This research was conducted over a period of 3 years (from 2016-2019) and is part of an ongoing 
project for a doctoral dissertation. I conducted interviews with 30 informants, with the theme of 
identity construction primarily along ethnic and national lines amongst people who identity as 
‘Chinese’ and ‘Bruneian’. 
These interviews were semi-structured and ranged from 1-4 hours long, the majority of which 
were conducted face-to-face where possible, or over internet calls (4 informants), with invitations to 
conduct face-to-face follow-up interviews. These informants were accessed and reached out through 
personal networks and snowball sampling. 
My informants range from those who currently remain in Brunei, either as stateless or as 
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citizens, as well as those who have migrated to Canada and Singapore, with one informant migrating 
to Australia, their ages ranging from 20s to 90s. Including different categories of membership in 
tandem to the nation-state (citizen, stateless, permanent resident) helped in the analysis of the 
different layers of their exemption from the nation-state. Furthermore, interviews were conducted 
with those who are considered ‘others’; Malay Muslims, as well as Chinese Muslims, in order to 
account for their perspectives and experiences.  
As a female, ethnic Chinese researcher, I was considered an ‘insider’, therefore assisting in 
creating an atmosphere of relative trust and assumed understanding on my part, despite being a 
citizen myself. Additionally, given my extremely limited use understanding of the Chinese language 
and the varying degrees of Chinese dialects spoken, my group of informants form a specific 
proportion of people who are English-speaking (though with varying fluency) and well-educated, 
therefore indicative of a specific socio-economic background. Where informants were not fluent in 
English, their kin were made available to explain their narratives. 
3. The Chinese as a Collective of Denizens
3.1 Background
Brunei is a small nation-state located on Borneo island, which also houses the Indonesian state 
of Kalimantan and the federal Malaysian states, Sarawak and Sabah, the latter two commonly called 
East Malaysia. Its territorial size is 5,765km2, and population stands currently at 423,188, but this 
also includes categories of expatriates and migrant workers. The official language is Malay and 
the official state religion is Islam. The official designation of the state’s method of governance is 
‘constitutional monarchy’ (similar to the United Kingdom) but, in reality constitutes an absolute 
monarchy (as of the cabinet reshuffle in 2018, the monarch has maintained his position as Sultan 
(King), Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance as well as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade). Brunei was previously a British Protectorate since 1888, achieved independence 
fairly late, in 1984. The national revenues come from the petroleum sector, exporting oil and natural 
gas, with attempts to diversify the economy from the dependence on this sector though full success 
has not been achieved (de Vienne 2015). 
Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) meaning Malay Muslim Monarchy proves to be one of the tenets 
of Brunei identity and, by extension, the basis of the state’s nationalistic ideology, as one can see 
from the passage above. The phrase was in official use during the Sultan’s independence speech 
in 1984, free from the British protectorate status. This slogan, according to Talib’s observations, 
was officiated by the Sultan to encourage loyalty to the nation and the political legitimacy of the 
regime, and upholds Islam as the national religion as well as the rights and privileges of the Malay 
ethnic community (Talib 2002). However, Brunei is far from ethnically and religiously homogenous. 
Graham Saunders, one of the few historians on Brunei, notes that the total population (which totaled 
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around 227,000 at the time the book was published but now has doubled that figure), included 
Malays, Chinese, indigenous groups such as Dusuns, Ibans, Kedayans, expatriates from Europe, 
New Zealand, Australia, as well as migrant workers from Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Indonesia (Saunders 2002). 
Pre-independence, Chinese migration into Southeast Asia was extensive and experienced a series 
of fluxes over centuries, taking place as early as 1264 AD in Brunei’s case (Mead and Lim 2006), 
reaching a peak in the fifteenth century (Wade 2008). Of great significance in this vast expanse of 
Chinese migration is modern Chinese migration taking place from 19th to 20th century, particularly 
with the allowance given to the layman to migrate overseas (McKeown 1999), leading to the 
emergence of an ethnic community known as the Overseas Chinese, though with varying levels of 
cultural and linguistic practices and claims to the identity ‘Chinese’. 
There were shifts in attitudes from China towards the Chinese residing overseas; the fluidity 
towards Chinese nationals and their children abroad and the allowance for dual nationality in 1929 
was subsequently revoked in 1980 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China. Alongside 
these shifts were attitudes towards the Chinese residing in Brunei that were not necessarily positive 
or welcoming. The officer of the Colonial Legal Office of the British government, R. H. Hickling who 
penned the memorandum for the Brunei Constitution and Practice in 1954, was of the view that a 
Chinese subject born and living in Brunei was by jus soli a natural born subject of the Sultan though 
by jus sanguinis may also be a Chinese subject. Despite this, inclusion and acceptance of ethnic 
Chinese into the state was resented and visiting Malayan dignitaries to the Brunei court warned 
against this (Hussainmiya and Tarling 2011). Thus, amidst the emergence of the modern nation-
state, notions of nationality and belonging for the Chinese of Brunei were fraught with uncertainty. 
3.2 Layers of Membership and Documentation
A report from the Current Issues Brief No. 1, 1984 from the parliament of the commonwealth of 
Australia, penned by Dr. Michael Leigh, aptly titled ‘Brunei – Independence for whom?’ not only 
lays out the rather extraordinary circumstances of the survival of ‘Brunei’ as a modern nation-state 
and its economic prosperity on oil and gas leading to the creation of a welfare state, but additionally 
dedicates an entire section entitled ‘The Stateless Chinese’. He lays out a multitude of aspects of the 
‘stateless’ problem that is still endemic until today, namely that a proportion of the ethnic Chinese 
community would lose their status as British Protected Persons (BPP) and become stateless, 
with no rights to British citizenship, that almost all Chinese applications for citizenship through a 
language test were effectively rejected, and under jus sanguinis remain non-nationals despite being 
born and raised in Brunei for generations (Leigh 1984).  
Inheritance of citizenship also remains gendered. Prior to the 2002 revisions of the Nationality 
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Act, children were able to inherit Bruneian citizenship automatically only if their father was a 
Bruneian citizen. After the revisions, children can now inherit Bruneian citizenship through their 
mother if their father is a non-national of Brunei, but this process still requires registration and 
application, and is not an automatic procedure, as highlighted by the 3rd cycle of the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) undertaken by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) in their 
report (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019). My informants have experienced 
the myriad of policies as stated, unable to attain citizenship because their father was a non-citizen, 
or rejected as they had failed a citizenship test. 
With regards to documentation, the stateless do not possess passports, but instead an 
International Certificate of Identity (ICI). In addition to this, all residents, both short-term and long-
term, must possess an Identity Card (IC). The IC is colour-coded; yellow denotes possession of 
Bruneian citizenship, green denotes long-term residency, and purple denotes permanent residency 
(though oddly commonly referred to as ‘red’). Stateless persons however, are lumped into the 
same category as PR holders, though there are significant differences within said group as to their 
citizenship status as well as ties to Brunei (Department of Immigration and Registration Brunei 
Darussalam). Thus, they constitute a group of people who remain displaced in situ (Belton 2015).
What of citizenship and how is it stratified in Brunei? Membership in Brunei is codified beyond 
a passport and an Identity Card (IC), splitting into different categories that appear to measure 
authenticity of belonging. First, through birth and registration, whereby those who were born 
into citizenship to parents who are citizenship holders are mutlak undang-undang (Department of 
Economic Planning and Statistics), and those who are citizens through pendaftaran (registration), 
the latter subject to their citizenship being revoked in cases of criminal behaviour as laid out in 
the Nationality Act, section 11 (Brunei Nationality Act 2002). Furthermore, a system similar to the 
pribumi or bumiputera (sons of the soil) of Malaysia and Indonesia there is the category of puak 
jati (roughly translates to indigenous groups), more known colloquially as rakyat jati, and applies to 
select groups of Malays (de Vienne 2015). Thus, the Chinese of Brunei do not constitute puak jati, 
and those who are citizens are further split into a hierarchy of those who registered as or were born 
as citizens to Bruneian parents. Citizenship is often posited as the antithesis to particularism, or 
politics of difference (Isin and Wood 1999), but as demonstrated, membership can be further split.   
This internal multilayered division is hardly unsurprising, as Torpey suggests that the conception 
of documentation or lack thereof is the implementation of the ‘idea’ of the nation, primarily carried 
out in order to categorise, legitimise, control, and surveil citizens of the state, and to identify those 
who are not and those who do not ‘belong’ (Torpey 2000). Thus, while there are salient differences 
between those who hold citizenship and those who remain stateless, even those who have managed 
to obtain citizenship remain more or less ‘second grade citizens’ de Vienne observing that the 
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ethnic Chinese act like economic mercenaries hired by the state (de Vienne 2015), their presence 
tolerated as subjects in driving economic growth but not given complete rights and access to welfare 
and benefits. From here I discuss the concept of denizen in citizenship literature.  
3.3 Denizenship
The general definition of a denizen is an inhabitant, one who frequents a place, or a person 
admitted to residence in a foreign country (Merriam-Webster). This definition allows a broad 
spectrum of interpretation. Hammar identifies the denizen as a foreign citizen with a secure 
residence status enjoying access to both state and private benefits such as employment, education, 
social welfare (Hammar 1990). Turner’s definition emphasizes the limitations of denizenship, 
defining it as a person who has a legal right of residence (by virtue of a visa or work permit in a 
given territory), but who has limited rights to welfare and political participation such as the right to 
vote (Turner 2016). Furthermore, he recognizes the extremes denizenship encapsulates, observing 
that ‘of course many denizens are actually stateless persons with little or no rights at all. More 
precisely, denizens as migrants, are often more dependent on human rights and not citizenship for 
protection’ (Turner 2016) 
These definitions make it clear that stateless persons fall under the general rubric of the denizen. 
However, I posit that the term and concept of denizen applies to Chinese citizens in Brunei. 
The concept of citizenship in an autocratic, oil-producing rentier state differs from that of liberal 
democratic nation-states, where a key citizenship right, political participation and the right to vote, 
does not apply at all, as there is no voting mechanism. In these regimes, the relationship is closer 
to a bargain where the government bribes citizens with extensive social and welfare programmes, 
causing citizens to lack incentive to bring about social or political change (Beblawi and Luciani 
1987). It would be more accurate to state that they are subjects of the state. Rosbrook-Thompson 
makes a case for the notion of denizenship that includes non-citizens and citizens in a formal sense, 
through their rejection of belonging of the nation and their responsibilities and duties of what 
citizenship entails such as voting or tax-paying (Rosbrook-Thompson 2015). Similarly, I make a 
case for denizenship that includes ethnic Chinese, who are citizens in a formal sense, but whose 
experiences that are detailed below, demonstrates a lack of inclusion and differential treatment. The 
status of being a ‘denizen’ or a non-citizen is described as ‘second-class citizenship’ (Benton 2014) 
but denizenship can also be expressed in those who are formally classed as citizens. As Ellermann 
rightly points out, permanent residents and certain citizens are not exempt from and in fact may 
experience legal precarity and loss of status (Ellermann 2019). 
There are scholarly attempts to reconceptualize people who do not fit the standard of citizenship, 
such as the theorizing undertaken by Tonkiss and Bloom. They argue for the term ‘noncitizenship’ 
in an attempt to decentralize citizenship as well as to debunk assumptions that all paths lead to 
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citizenship (Tonkiss and Bloom 2015). Indeed, welfare, benefits, belonging, as well as means of 
living a fulfilling life can occur outside the framework of the nation-state and citizenship. However, 
given the resilience of the nation-state, as well as the pragmatic desires of my informants for a 
more inclusive notion of citizenship, this paper will utilize the term denizenship as opposed to 
noncitizenship.  
To supplement theories and concepts of citizenship and denizenship, understanding lived, 
everyday experiences is crucial. Through empirical studies, a more intimate and grounded 
perspective is gained with regards to the everyday and long-term constraints people face, crucial 
to supplement the theoretical aspect within citizenship and stateless studies (Deforges et al 2005; 
Hall and Williamson 1999). Given the lack of transparency on these issues and at times, difficulty 
in finding official documentation, these narratives are all the more crucial to understand the points 
at which they experience denizenship. By gathering a varied cluster of ethnic Chinese of Brunei 
of various statuses (stateless, Canadian citizens, Brunei citizens, Bruneian PRs, Singaporean PRs), 
I posit that they exemplify the multiplicity of membership within a nation-state which allocates 
rights and entitlements on the basis of ethnicity. I track the boundaries they encounter as effective 
denizens, and the strategies they opt to take when negotiating the structural barriers of the nation-
state. They embody the importance for accounting for both agency and structure, exemplifying 
that they are not simply ‘mechanical products of their objective circumstances’ (Appadurai 2000, 
p. 4), but at the same time demonstrate the limits of their agency, having to seek out alternative 
opportunities and strategies. 
The usefulness of the term ‘denizenship’ and ‘denizen’ hopefully allows for a closer, focused 
look at the systemic nature of welfare exemption from the nation-state, not only for migrants and 
permanent residents, but also those who are formal citizens. The term highlights discrepancies 
and inequalities within the catch-all label of ‘citizen’, that might be based on categories of race, 
ethnicity, religion, and gender. This is not to disregard concepts of ethnic or racial discrimination, 
but to complement them by adding a focused component on, in this paper’s case, the tightly wound 
relationship between ethnicity and formal citizenship. 
4. Findings: The Hurdles of Denizenship 
4.1 The Stateless
4.1.1 Passport and Travel
Being stateless comes to the fore when excluded from domestic benefits from the state. As well, 
it is evident when one attempts to traverse national borders. As Turner points out, ‘denizens have 
some degree of freedom of movement internally, but their transition across national borders is 
normally precarious’ (Turner 2016). For those who are stateless, the international passport regime 
and borders are reminders of their status and lack of recognition as a person with full rights. 
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When questioned about any episodes of difficulty in crossing national borders, Martin, in his 60s, 
and currently stateless, shared a harrowing story of potential arrest and deportation, but, worry and 
fear spurred him to request not to detail his account. Another informant, Jake, in his 20s, currently 
stateless, was less wary and hence more willing to inform me of his experiences. He had travelled, 
though not too far out of the Southeast Asian region, the furthest place being Taiwan. I inquired 
as to whether he had traveled to ‘Western’ countries, and replied in the negative. He had actively 
avoided going to ‘Western’ countries (particularly the United States) given his own understanding 
of strict border and immigration control and fear that he would ultimately be deported.
We need to apply for visas everywhere except Singapore[...] visas doesn’t guarantee entry. A friend [of 
mine] was sent to Dubai for training and kicked back to Brunei. 
He was deported. To deport me back[...] it is such a waste of money. [...] I only traveled around Asia [...] 
it is just a paranoid feeling [at immigration] because it takes extra long. I travel to Taiwan often, I 
went 4 times, and the second time when they were inspecting my passport it took 30 minutes. It feels 
like a magnifying glass, asking questions [it is] the feeling and treatment despite having the ICI.
Jake’s narrative on his travels provide insight on a multitude of levels. There is the pragmatic 
frustration that travelling would become a wasted expense, as there is no guarantee of entry into the 
country of destination. Furthermore, there is the fear of ‘magnifying glass’, the immediate emotive 
impact on one’s psyche of being under the gaze of authority, but also that this fear and Martin’s 
earlier voiced fear of sharing border experiences stem from a similar place. It is here that we see the 
effects of global governance and power manifesting in the most intimate way within the individual. 
They are fully cognizant of international norms, aware that their documentation will fall under 
great scrutiny, and therefore subject to greater surveillance. While still able to travel regionally, my 
informants who were or are currently stateless conveyed similar sentiments as Jake did. Their status 
deterred them from going further than Asia, preferring to travel regionally. Even then, they were 
often made to wait and interrogated, adding to their sense of precarity and reinforcing their fear. 
The passport regime is still dominant and the binaries of citizen and non-citizen hold fast not simply 
at physical spaces such as immigration borders and ports of embarkation and disembarkation, but 
also in the imagination of the person.
4.1.2 Education
As a strong welfare state, various social goods are subsidized for citizens, one of which is 
education. It is compulsory by law in Brunei for any child, citizen or resident, above the age of 
six years and not yet of fifteen years to receive compulsory education for nine years (Compulsory 
Education Act 2007). Primary (Year 1 to Year 6) and secondary (Year 7 to Year 11) schooling 
are divided into government schools and private schools (The Brunei Education Statistics Book 
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2018 2019). All my informants who were or are currently stateless had attended private schools 
throughout their primary and secondary schooling, institutions that included Chinese schools as 
well as missionary schools. This is hardly surprising, given that schooling is free for citizens if they 
attend government schools, and non-citizens may apply to government schools if tuition is too costly 
in private schools, but still have to pay a fee to do so (World Data on Education 2006). 
Furthermore, when the issue of higher education was raised, Jake drew from his own experience, 
lamenting that citizens who went to the national university he himself had attended, the University 
of Brunei Darussalam (UBD), were given regular allowance to encourage schooling while the 
stateless would have to rely on parents’ funding or take on part-time jobs in order to fund their 
own expenses, of which no waiver was provided, and no schooling allowance given. This has 
changed since, with Bruneian citizens now paying the same amount of tuition fees as PRs at all 
levels of higher education. Yet, the stateless remain exempt from scholarships (Universiti Brunei 
Darussalam). The criteria for scholarships as well as exchange programmes such as the Discovery 
Year programme that allows students to go to popular destinations such as Korea or the UK, are 
divided into categories of citizen and foreigner. Jake had taken pains to point out that the stateless 
do not fall into any category, and therefore could not apply.  
The experience of being excluded from opportunities for higher education was similarly 
articulated by Beth, (60s), whom I interviewed during fieldwork in Canada. In the 1970s, Brunei 
had yet to establish domestic institutions of higher education beyond secondary level. UBD being 
the first of its kind, established in 1985. Hence, those who wished to pursue further studies needed 
to attend universities overseas (The National Education System for the 21st Century 2013, p. 7). 
Beth informed me that non-citizens were excluded from government funded programmes, and was 
instead introduced to opportunities for training in nursing, funded by the British Government which 
she had taken the chance to do. At the time of the interview, Beth was still working part-time as a 
nurse in Edmonton, and though we agreed on the value and dedication of nurses and careworkers, 
Beth had smiled ruefully, adding at the end of our discussion, that if she had been a citizen, she 
might have entertained the idea of becoming a doctor. 
Regardless of her occupation, Beth was able to obtain training and a degree in nursing in the 
United Kingdom, resulting in a relatively seamless migratory path when her family migrated to 
Canada, and she decided to join them, instead of staying in the UK. Other informants had similar 
such pathways, finding alternate methods of recourse that allowed them to pursue their education 
overseas and eventually settle in either Canada or Singapore, as permanent residents or as citizens. 
These stories demonstrate the varied experiences that the stateless of Brunei have, utilizing or 
chancing upon alternate sources from the nation-state and expressing their satisfaction with their 
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lifestyle and their life choices. As Allerton found in her study of stateless persons in Malaysia, the 
stateless people of Brunei provide an alternate image of statelessness often being conceived of as a 
state of being ‘forlorn’ or ‘hopeless’ (Allerton 2014). They are able to forge out satisfactory lives and 
demonstrate agency even with limitation of access to benefits and chances provided by the nation-
state. In spite of this, the informants still lament the membership that they are denied, and express 
wishes that acquisition of citizenship will eventually become more egalitarian, particularly those 
who remain in Brunei, and who remain stateless.   
4.2 Citizens
4.2.1 The Workplace
At a certain point during an interview with Mark, (60s), we began discussing his motivations 
for having migrated to Canada. He smiled and pointed at me, stating that if he had been like me, a 
citizen, given full access to benefits and welfare provided by Brunei, he would not have left, as there 
would be no practical reason to. In spite of building a sense of camaraderie based on our shared 
understanding that we were of the same ethnic group, some of my stateless informants carried out 
the same boundary making as Mark, rightly differentiating the experiences between citizen and 
stateless. 
However, ethnic Chinese who possess citizenship are not necessarily given equal treatments as 
ethnic Malay citizens are and full access to rights. David, retired in his 60s but currently residing 
in Australia with permanent residency but Bruneian citizenship, had lived through the days of pre-
Independence and after. David remarked that he was lucky that his father had been able to obtain 
citizenship, unlike his neighbours and peers in school who were ultimately unable to inherit the 
status. Despite retaining his citizenship and ultimately locating his belonging in Brunei as it was 
the country where he had spent his formative years, he spoke extensively of the discrimination he 
had experienced at the workplace whereby he was informed by word of mouth by his superiors 
that recruitment was halted for PRs, while promotions were prioritized for ethnic Malays as 
opposed to other ethnicities. The frustration at the inability to progress up the career ladder based 
on his ethnicity demonstrated that while David is technically and nominally a citizen, he was not 
immune from experiencing another layer of exclusion despite, on paper, being part of the national 
community.      
Thus, ironically, operating in a similar labour market as so-called ‘locals’ and competing for 
positions on the same playing field forced David to confront a different set of walls as compared 
to his co-ethnic counterparts of whom held permanent residency or were stateless and thus from 
the beginning unable to access the occupation, or even consider the possibility of being promoted. 
The sense and foreboding of the inability to progress in his career eventually spurred David to 
migrate out of Brunei, to escape ethnic discrimination in the workplace. When questioned, he had 
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framed it thus: ‘but really I did it for the kids’, even detailing how he had taken a family vacation 
to Australia prior to making the decision to migrate, to gauge the reaction of his children towards 
the atmosphere of the country. David was determined that his children would obtain permanent 
residency, and eventually citizenship in Australia, aware that more inclusive modes of denizenship 
and citizenship are accessible, but framed this as a last resort, lamenting that he had been reluctant 
to migrate.  
4.2.2 Land
Land acquisition, ownership, transfer as well as property ownership in Brunei are issues that are 
mired in uncertainty and a lack of transparency. While there are rules and regulations set out in 
black-and-white in the Land Code as well as the Land Code (Strata), demarcating ownership and 
transfer of land as a right belonging only to citizens, and property ownership rights extended to PRs 
and foreign property owners, these applications and cases are largely subject to the discretion of the 
Land Department and, as denoted in the legal code and act, His Majesty in Council. 
Struggles over land that adopt a strong cultural slant vis-à-vis the state or a major corporation 
are not uncommon; territory and national identity are strongly interlinked. De Vienne aptly details 
how the discovery of oil and gas in Brunei concentrated economic and subsequently cultural power 
into the hands of the monarch, leading to an ‘identity blaze’ and promotion of national values which 
culminated in restricted access to land property, as aforementioned by Leigh. She notes that, “Since 
1979, any acquisition (or long term lease) of land, by a Bruneian as by a foreigner, private individual 
or company has been subjected to the approval of the Sultan. Worse, a maximum of 2 hectares of 
land was unofficially imposed to Chinese citizens. Even duly approved and paid, they could not and 
still cannot get their acquisitions registered (de Vienne 2011, p. 37).”
While most of my stateless informants had voiced dissatisfaction with the laws on property and 
land ownership, acquisition, and inheritance, similar concerns were voiced by ethnic Chinese 
citizens. Hassan, 60s, a Chinese Muslim informant and citizen, had identified as a Muslim even 
in his childhood, as he grew up in a tight-knit Muslim neighbourhood, that had encouraged his 
family to visit their local mosque, even prior to the family’s conversion, and had eventually married 
an ethnic Malay Muslim woman. When I asked whether he considered himself Chinese, he had 
been passionate in his claim over his ethnicity and informed that in official documentation, he is 
categorized as such. He began pointing out salient incidents where his ethnicity came to the fore. 
This opened up to a discussion on land inheritance, Hassan expressing concern over unfounded 
rumours circulating widely that passing on land to next of kin for ethnic Chinese citizens would be 
restricted and made effectively impossible. He stated that he was not worried for his daughters, 
whom he assumed would go on to marry ethnic Malays, but for his sons, because on paper, it 
would be a transfer of land and/or property from an ethnic Chinese father to his ethnic Chinese 
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son. At the time of writing this paper, the rumours had yet to be substantiated by relevant officials 
or to be enacted as law, but had taken root within the understanding amongst the ethnic Chinese 
community.
Hassan’s narrative, on the one hand, expressed his anxiety about the property right as an ethnic 
Chinese. It is also an important piece of empirical evidence showing that he was affirmative of his 
ethnic identity despite his religious conversion. This observation counters what Sanders observes 
of Brunei, where he notes that non-Malay converts to Islam in Brunei generally adopt a Malay name 
and customs. According to him, to convert to Islam is therefore to “masuk Melayu”, to effectively 
become Malay (Saunders 2002). While it is true that one adopts a Malay/Islamic name and is 
expected to follow religious and cultural customs, Hassan, and another Chinese Muslim informant, 
had identified not as Malay, but as Chinese, and seemed proud of their heritage. They were also 
categorized as such in official documentation, demonstrating a recognition of hybrid identities, but 
one that has conflicting and contradictory elements. As Muslims, they are culturally subsumed into 
the social life of ethnic Malays, particularly if married to an ethnic Malay. However, they share in 
the same exclusion and discrimination that the ethnic Chinese face, demonstrating the boundaries 
that are maintained in order to safeguard the true ideal characteristic of a citizen; to be both Malay 
and Muslim, puak jati.  
These two aspects of exclusion, ceilings in career progression and difficulties in land acquisition, 
are but two examples of the gatekeeping that occurs within the country, often unofficial (as 
evident in de Vienne’s observation and the narratives of the two informants). Thus, it is difficult to 
substantiate and justify, perhaps even more than the case for statelessness, precisely because they 
fall under the rubric of being ‘citizens’ and with it, the bundle of benefits and access to social goods. 
They are effectively denizens with more access to benefits and ease of travel than their stateless 
counterparts, but demonstrate the presence of gaps and barriers as they experience deeper 
integration within society but of being of a different ethnicity. Those who are of stateless status 
would be unaware of the barriers ethnic Chinese citizens face precisely because they are unable to 
enter these spaces in the first place. 
5. Conclusion 
I have demonstrated above how my informants have faced different facets of exclusion. These 
modes of exclusion fall under the umbrella of ethnic discrimination, and supplementing this with 
the additional concept of the ‘denizen’ allows us to see the ways in which ethnicity and citizenship 
intersect with one another and manifests as policies that impact the life paths and psyche of people. 
While this paper dealt exclusively with the case of the ethnic Chinese in Brunei, further research 
could be conducted with other groups that fall under the term denizen such as non-Muslim 
indigenous groups, Filipino and Indonesian domestic care workers, or migrant workers that are 
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deemed low-skilled hailing from Thailand, Bangladesh, and India, to map out and juxtapose their 
trajectories and experiences.  
Though citizenship and its acquisition does not necessitate in the complete and entire banishment 
of inequality, it exists, whether benign or consequential, and so it is of no surprise that the 
informants thus operate and strategise within the confines of this system. But as human rights 
are largely unenforceable (Isin and Turner 2002) and the prospect of an overarching international 
enforcement of human rights seems distant, there is still a need to forward the claim for meaningful 
citizenship. The promise of citizenship has a multitude of positive bearings and meanings; to feel 
blanketed and secure in membership, liberated from the scrutiny of the gaze of governmentality 
at borders (Foucault 1982; Walters 2015) and immigration, and no longer conceptualized as 
‘incomplete’ as a person or as a member of a particular nation-state. The discussions of the 
potentiality of postnational citizenship, regional citizenship, or cosmopolitan citizenship develop, 
rightfully so, but we need to remember “it is all too easy to ignore the facts on the ground: gaining 
access to membership status remains crucially important for defining our scope of opportunity, 
security, and sense of belonging” (Shachar, 2009, p. 29).
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Notes
1 accessed via microfilm archives of the Singapore National Library/Lee Kong Chian Reference Library)
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